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Abstract. Anybody can make a time information authentic easily nowa-
days with the help of a time-stamp by a Certiﬁcation Authority. In
this paper, we propose a similar service for mobile devices—which have
GPS receiver–to authentication GPS coordinates. This service name is
location-stamping, and we propose two protocols for this service.
1 Introduction
Nowadays the applications which based on the Global Positioning System
(GPS) gain more and more place for themselves, like the locating, passenger
guiding, traﬃc controlling, tracking or navigation system. These services be-
came vital parts of our everyday life. A big percentage of the mobile devices
have a GPS receiver too.
In 2001 Alf Zugenmaier and Matthias Kabatnik in [8] introduced a location-
stamp service for mobile telephone network. Their solution authenticates cell
information. The usage of the protocol mentioned in this article is impossible
in the case of GPS because the Certiﬁcation Authority and the Location Mea-
surement System carry on two-way communication with each other. In our case
the Location Measurement System is the GPS, where the communication is
one-way, because the satellite only can send the information, but can’t receive
it. In this article we propose two solutions for the cryptographic authenti-
cation of GPS coordinates. The basic idea is that the data received and/or
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computed by the GPS device are sent to a trusted organization, which can be
for example a certiﬁcation authority. Of course the GPS device digitally signs
the message. If this information is compatible with other information available
by the organization, then it signs the GPS coordinates. The basic diﬀerence
between the two solutions is that while in the ﬁrst case we assume that we
have access to the row data sent by the satellites and received by the GPS de-
vice, thus they can be signed; however in the second case we have access only
to the computed GPS coordinates. Thus the ﬁrst protocol is favorable, but
the second is safe enough in most applications. This paper is the essentially
revised and extended version of our publication [1].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief introduction to
the basics of Global Positioning Systems (GPS). In Section 3 we compare the
geodesic and cryptographic notion of authenticity. Furthermore we describe
situations when cryptographic authentication of GPS data may be important.
Finally in Section 4 we present two protocols, which are able to solve the basic
problem of authentication of GPS coordinates.
2 Global Positioning System
“The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based global navigation
satellite system that provides location and time information anywhere on or
near the Earth.” [3] The position calculation is based on trilateration with
satellites orbiting in space, and the measuring system is a receiver, which
communicates with the satellites through radio-waves. This communication is
one way because the satellites only can send the information, but cannot re-
ceive it. Several software exist which are able to calculate the GPS coordinates
from the “raw” data which come from the satellites. For this reason, a GPS
receiver calculates the actual coordinates with a special software, from the
data received from the satellites through radio-waves. The Global Positioning
System has three distinct segments. These segments are the space segment,
the control segment and the user segment. The space segment formed from
a constellation of 24 satellites. The control segment consists of the stations,
which control the satellites from the Earth and last the user segment means
anybody, who receives the data which come from the satellites. See more about
the Global Positioning System in the following books [3, 2].
3 Authenticity
It is very important to deﬁne the diﬀerences between the geodesic and the
cryptographic authenticity, to understand the aims of this paper.
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3.1 Geodesic authenticity
If we measure the position of an object, we can do it accurate with the
help of the Global Positioning System. But this accuracy can mean diﬀerent
measuring result for diﬀerent people. “For example to a hiker or soldier in
the desert, accurate means about 15m. To a ship in coastal waters, accurate
means 5m. To a land surveyor, accurate means 1cm or less. GPS can be used
to achieve all of these accuracies in all of these applications, the diﬀerence
being the type of GPS receiver used and the technique employed.” [4] In some
cases we need extremely high accuracy. For example in the OPERA project
of CERN the distance of the source of the CNGS neutrino beams at CERN
and the OPERA detector at Gran Sasso, which is about 730 km was measured
with a precision of 20 cm. [3] It is possible to correct the calculations with a
lot of diﬀerent methods. So we may declare that the GPS coordinates of an
object are more accurate from geodesy viewpoint when we can calculate them
with much smaller diﬀerence. In other words, it means, we can calculate them
more precisely. To improve the precision of GPS coordinates the mathematical
methods must be made more accurate. The devices are validated regularly,
which means that their results are compared with the results of authentic
devices.
3.2 Cryptographic authenticity
In this paper we deal with the cryptographic authenticity of GPS coordi-
nates. We use a lot of data while we work with the GPS system, for example
the raw data arriving from a satellite, the time information or the calculated
coordinates. The task of cryptography is to prevent these data from chang-
ing during the process of the calculations. The changes can be made by for
example a malicious person, a virus, a modiﬁed device or modiﬁed software
sometimes it may happen by chance.
The cryptographic authenticity—as any other prevention—costs time and
money. Only such data should be prevented, which are worth enough. We
should ask the question: is the authenticity of these data important? The
answer depends on the application. It is true that for example in passenger
guiding, or in navigation not really important the above-mentioned certainty
because the calculation of GPS coordinates takes so little time and it hap-
pens so often that there is no chance to change them and there is no point
in changing them too. At the topic of vehicle-tracking, certainty-problem also
forced a little bit, but for example, if you would like to prove with GPS coor-
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dinates that the fences of your neighbor is on your place it is quite certain that
you will need some kind of authentication before the oﬃcial establishments to
prove your truth. Until in an argument of a parcel the Land Register proceed,
and make exact measurement, but it cannot do in any cases due to capacity
problems.
For the foregoing case here is an example, and this will be our main example:
A supervisor of the Land Registry ﬁnds a ﬁeld where the ragweed had pro-
liferated. He wants to ﬁne the owner. To prove his truth he makes an oﬃcial
report:
• locates the area with a GPS device,
• signs the report digitally,
• and asks for an authentic time stamp.
After all these, he proves when the report was made and that he made it. If
the aforesaid cases come on for trial, then neither the penalized driver nor
the civil servant can prove that their GPS coordinates are match the place
where they made it. Despite the fact that the supervisor certiﬁed the location
information by his digital signature.
They cannot prove that the location information is correct because not a
single people or device is fully trusted too. Electronically saved or transmitted
data can be changed easily, thus without some kind of provable signature the
authenticity of data is always questionable. That is why we need some kind of
service, which helps us to certify our place authentically, by GPS coordinates.
In this article we suggest a solution to this problem. Our solution that is
the location-stamp may be similar to the time-stamp for the above problems.
The time stamp is provided by a Certiﬁcation Authority. The plan with the
location stamp is similar, we need an organization that is independent from
the measurement and can guarantee that nobody modiﬁed the results we got.
We think this location stamp service workable by a Certiﬁcation Authority
too. Actually, the aim is that we should make us independent from the person
who makes the measurement and the device which makes it.
4 Problem formulation
As for the precision of the device, there are several options for the crypto-
graphic authenticity:
• First we trust the person and the device in all cases. We accept the
measured coordinates, and the time provided by the device.
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• Second we trust the person and the device, but we do not trust the time
information of the device. We accept the measured coordinates, but we
do not accept the time provided by the device.
• Third we neither trust the person nor the device. We neither accept the
measured coordinates nor the time provided by the device.
In this paper we only deal with this third option and we introduce two solutions
for that option. First there is a higher safety solution, which is the driver-level
solution, and then there is a lower safety solution that is the software-level
solution. The diﬀerences between these two solutions are the following: in
the ﬁrst case the authentic software is built in the driver level of a mobile
device. The data are signed immediately the device received them. Thus the
provided security is as high as possible. On the other hand it is very hardware
dependent. In the second case the authentic software is on the level of the
operating system. Its security is a little bit less than in the other solution.
Thus we complement this version with a trilateration for the mobile device for
added security.
We use the following cryptographic primitives during the work of the pro-
tocols: digital signature, hash function and time stamp. We do not detail the
working of these cryptographic primitives here, but we recommend the book
[7] for the interested readers for the easier understanding.
5 Protocols
5.1 High-safety solution: Driver-level
In this solution our aim is to get the raw data before somebody could modify
them. We try to build our authentic software in a very deep layer of the process,
so we would like to build it in the driver level.
5.1.1 Participants and notations
GPS is the Global Positioning System. The satellites of this system provide
the data from which the GPS receiver calculates the coordinates of the actual
position.
MD is the Mobile Device. The device with a GPS receiver, we make the
positioning and the authentication with the help of this device.
CA is the Certiﬁcation Authority. It provides the authenticate time and
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Figure 1: Driver-level protocol
location stamp, this is an organization, which is independent from the mea-
surement and can guarantee that nobody modiﬁed the results we got.
AS is the Authentic Software. This software makes the authentication for
the raw data (which come from the satellites) and for the calculated GPS
coordinates.
CS is the Calculator Software. This software calculates the GPS coordinates
of the actual position from the raw data come from the satellites.
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M is the text or photo or some other data, that we want to authenticate
with a location-stamp.
h(. . . ) is the hash function.
H is the hash value of the M.
c(. . . ) is the calculator function, which calculates the current position from
the raw data that come from the satellites.
RD is the raw data come from one of the satellites of Global Positioning
System.
GPSc is the GPS coordinate calculated by the calculator software.
SAS(. . .) is the signature of the data in parenthesis with the private key of
the authentic software.
SCA(. . .) is the signature of the data in parenthesis with the private key of
the certiﬁcation authority.
VAS(. . .) is the veriﬁcation of the data in parenthesis with the public key of
the authentic software.
VCA(. . .) is the veriﬁcation of the data in parenthesis with the public key of
the certiﬁcation authority.
si is the ith signed data.
TIME is the time information.
t is the time information of RD.
ALS is the authentic location stamp, generated by the certiﬁcation author-
ity.
f (. . . ) is the freshness checking function.
5.1.2 Protocol
1. MD calculates the hash value of M : H = h(M)
2. MD→ AS : H||M
3. AS digitally signs H with its private key: s1 = SAS(H)
4. GPS→ AS : RD
5. AS digitally signs the hash value of RD with its private key:
s2 = SAS(h(RD))
6. AS→ CS : RD
7. CS calculates the actual position from RD : GPSc = c(RD)
8. AS← CS : GPSC
9. AS digitally signs the hash value of GPSc with its private key:
s3 = SAS(h(GPSc))
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10. AS concatenates H, s1 , RD, s2 , GPSc and s3 and takes its hash value
and then digitally signs this hash value with its private key:
s4 = SAS(h(H||RD||GPSc||s1||s2||s3))
11. AS→ CA : H||RD||GPSc||s1||s2||s3||s4
12. CA veriﬁes that the raw data were signed by AS and CA veriﬁes that
GPSc can be computed from RD, and checks the freshness of the t.
VAS(s2)
c(RD) = ?GPSc
f(t)
12.1. if the answer is true for all questions, then CA makes the authentic
location-stamp:
ALS = TIME||SCA(h(H||RD||GPSc||s1||s2||s3||s4||TIME))
AS← CA : ALS
12.1.1. AS veriﬁes that really the CA signed the location-stamp that
it got:
VCA(ALS)
12.1.1.1. if the answer is true, then AS accepts the authentic location-
stamp
12.1.1.2. if the answer is false, then AS starts a new location-stamp
request with step 4.
12.2. if the answer is false, then CA rejects to generate the authentic
location-stamp
AS← CA : rejection
5.1.3 Protocol description
The protocol, described in the previous subsection, have three important
participants, these are the satellites of the Global Positioning System, the
mobile device and the certiﬁcation authority. The mobile device generates a
print of the data,—we want to stamp with an authentic location stamp—
initially with an eligible hash function, this is necessary because of the digital
signing. After this the authentic software, which is built in the driver of the
mobile device, gets the data from the three GPS satellites, and then it digitally
signs these data with its own private key presently. This signing is required in
order that nobody is able to falsify during the computational process the raw
data arriving from the satellites. The authentic software located in the driver
of the mobile device so it can protect the data from the attack of any software
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installed on the operation system of the mobile device. Once the authentic
software digitally signed and stored the raw data, sends it to the calculator
software. The calculator software calculates the current GPS coordinates from
the present raw data and sends back the result to the authentic software. The
authentic software digitally signs these data too. Now we arrived at the point
that the authentic software is able to ask for an authentic time stamp from
the certiﬁcation authority. So the authentic software sends a request to the
certiﬁcation authority, this request contains the data hash value, the raw data
and the calculated coordinates concatenated and digitally signed with its own
private key. Then the certiﬁcation authority generates a nonce value in order
to ensure the freshness of the protocol and gives it back to the software. The
authentic software appends the nonce to the previous request and turns it back
to the certiﬁcation authority, which checks that really the authentic software
sent the request. If the result of the veriﬁcation is right then the certiﬁcation
authority checks that GPSc can be computed from the raw data, if the answer
is true, then it generates the location stamp, which also includes a time stamp
too.
5.2 Lower-safety solution: Software-level
The protocol of the previous section is hardware dependent. This is because
we signed the raw data received by the GPS device from the satellites. Our aim
in the sequel is to describe a less hardware dependent authentication. Thus
we cannot assume to have access to the raw data, but only calculated GPS
coordinates. Hence to authenticate the data of the GPS device, the trusted
organization has to have own data which it can compare with received ones.
The mobile phone services have cell information, but they are usually not
accurate enough to ﬁx the location the GPS device. By our knowledge this is
possible in bigger cities where the mobile network coverage is broad enough.
Then the mobile phone service has independent information on the location
of the GPS device, which can be compared to the data it sends to the trusted
organization. This second protocol is only applicable if the above assumption
holds. After this preparation we present the details of the protocol.
5.2.1 Participants and notations
Here we mention only those symbols which diﬀer from participants or nota-
tions in the previous protocol, other symbols denote the same as above. MPSP
is the Mobile Phone Service Provider, this provides the cell information for a
mobile identiﬁer.
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Figure 2: Sotware-level protocol
AS is the Authentic Software. This software makes the authentication for
the calculated GPS coordinates.
MoID is the Mobil identiﬁer, a number from which the MPSP can identify
the current mobile device.
t(. . . ) is the trilateration function, trilaterates the CI from the MoID.
CI is the cell information from the MPSP.
ck(. . . ) is the checking function, which checks if a GPS coordinates are in
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the area which is deﬁned by the cell information.
SMPSP(. . .) is the signature of the data in parenthesis with the private key
of the mobile phone service provider.
VMPSP(. . .) is the veriﬁcation of the data in parenthesis with the public key
of the mobile phone service provider.
5.2.2 Protocol
1. MD calculates the hash value of M : H = h(M)
2. MD→ AS : H||M
3. GPS→ AS : RD
4. AS calculates the actual position from RD : GPSc = c(RD)
5. AS concatenates MoID, H, RD and GPSc and digitally signs its hash
value with its private key:
s1 = SAS(h(MoID||H||RD||GPSc))
6. AS→ CA : MoID||H||RD||GPSc||s1
7. CA veriﬁes that the raw data were signed by AS and CA veriﬁes that
GPSc can be computed from RD and checks the freshness of the t.
VAS(s1)
c(RD) = ?GPSc
f(t)
7.1. if the answer is true then:
CA→MPSP : MoID and asks for a cell information
7.1.1. MPSP trilaterates CI from the MoID:
t(MoID) = CI
s2 = SMPSP(MOID||CI)
CA←MPSP : MOID||CI||s2
7.1.2. CA veriﬁes that really the MPSP signed the data, which it got,
and, that the GPSc matches to the CI:
VMPSP(s2)
ck(GPSc,CI) = true
7.1.2.1. if the answer is true, then CA makes the authentic location-
stamp:
ALS = TIME||SCA(h(MoID||H||RD||GPSc||s1||s2||CI||TIME))
AS← CA : ALS
7.1.2.1.1. AS veriﬁes that really the CA signed the location-stamp
that it got:
VCA(ALS)
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7.1.2.1.1.1 if the answer is true, then AS accepts the authentic
location-stamp
7.1.2.1.1.2 if the answer is false then AS starts a new location
stamp request with the step 3.
7.1.2.2. if the answer it false then CA asks a new cell information
with the step
7.2. if the answer is false, then CA rejects to generate the authentic
location stamp
AS← CA : rejection
5.2.3 Protocol description
Against the protocol, described in the previous chapter, in this part the pro-
tocol has four important participants, the satellites of the Global Positioning
System, the mobile device, the certiﬁcation authority and the mobile phone
service provider of the actual mobile device. There are some other diﬀerences
between the two protocols, in the previous solution the authentic software is
built in the driver level of the mobile device, in the actual case the software is
installed on the operation system of the mobile device as it usually. The mo-
bile device initially generates a print of the data with a hash function as same
as the previous case. After this the authentic software, which is installed on
the mobile device, gets the data from the three GPS satellites, and calculates
the current GPS coordinates from the present raw data. Then it concatenates
these two values, the document hash value and the mobile device identiﬁer
and digitally signs with its own private key. After this the authentic soft-
ware asks for an authentic time stamp from the certiﬁcation authority with
the help of these digitally signed data. The certiﬁcation authority generates a
nonce value in order to ensure the freshness of the protocol and gives it back
to the software. The authentic software appends the nonce to the previous
request and turns it back to the certiﬁcation authority, which checks that re-
ally the authentic software sent the request. Now the certiﬁcation authority
sends the identiﬁer of the mobile device to the mobile phone service provider,
which trilaterates the cell information for the device and gives it back. In this
point only the veriﬁcation remains behind. If the result of the veriﬁcation is
right, namely the calculated GPS coordinates matches to the cell information,
and the private key belongs the authenticate software, then the certiﬁcation
authority generates the location stamp, which also includes a time stamp too.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/2/16 10:53 AM
Location-stamp for GPS coordinates 75
6 Attacks
In the ﬁeld of authentication of GPS information there are two main type
of the possible attacks, these are jamming and spooﬁng.
• Jamming
In the course of jamming the attacker try to interrupt the connection be-
tween GPS satellites and GPS receivers. It is fairly an easy task, considering
that the GPS satellites are orbiting in the space 20 000 km far from the Earth.
This is the ﬁrst reason why the broadcast signals are not too powerful and
the other reason is that this communication happens over wireless connection.
Therefore, the aim of the attacker is that make the satellites inaccessible for
the receivers. In order to achieve the former goals the attacker produce an
obstruction into the connection.
• Spooﬁng
In contrast with jamming, in the course of spooﬁng attack the connection be-
tween satellites and receivers is in good working order. Spooﬁng cause a much
more dangerous situation. The attacker transmits a more powerful signal than
the signal broadcast by the GPS satellites. From this point the receiver will
think that this modiﬁed signal is the original which comes from the satellites.
The fact that the receiver will receive this modiﬁed signal means that the at-
tacker can fake the location information of the receiver, and this can mislead
the user.
Compared to some other authentication method for GPS coordinates [5, 6]
none of our protocols protects against jamming and only one of them protects
against spooﬁng, but this was not the goal that we would have liked to achieve.
Neither spooﬁng nor jamming is relevant to our case because this protocol is
intended to use in the civil service. In the case that someone disrupts or ter-
minates information ﬂow - so the jamming occurred -, then there is simply no
data that needs to be validated. There is a low-level security against spoof-
ing in the second protocol, but this type of attack is not probable, because
these data we would like to verify are not at the high classiﬁed level. So these
data are not worth so much to make sense of spooﬁng—falsifying the GPS
signals—. If you would like to verify a high classiﬁed data, then this can easily
achieved by strengthen our protocol with another anti-spooﬁng solution, our
make some changes on one of these protocols. Maybe in the future we will use
some of these solutions to amplify the security of our protocol. In summary,
our solution protects data from that point that they are in the mobile device.
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7 Conclusion
In this article, we describe two protocols to authenticate GPS coordinates
in a mobile device, and we did not give solutions to jamming or spooﬁng
attack. So this service can only provide against for example the following
type of attacks: modiﬁed software on the mobile device (which calculate false
coordinates), direct adding a fake location information to the device (by hand,
or by sms, or via email) or some analogue attacks. In a second article we would
like to analyze the security and complexity of these protocols.
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